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I. Introduction
As a practicing psychoanalyst as well as a law professor, I
have more than an academic interest in the fate of the recently
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A., Brandeis University, 1965; M.A., Harvard University, 1967; J.D., University
of Michigan, 1974; Certificate in Psychoanalysis, San Francisco Psychoanalytic
Institute, 1995. Member and faculty, San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute;
member, Joint Committee on Confidentiality, American Psychoanalytic
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Brian Coolidge, Boalt Class of 2001, for their able research assistance, and my
Hastings colleagues David Levine and Roger Park for their helpful comments on
early drafts of this Article. The research on which this Article is based was
supported in part by a Hastings summer research grant, for which I am grateful.
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recognized psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal court While
a similar privilege already exists in all fifty states, its recognition
by the United States Supreme Court has both practical and
symbolic value. From a practical standpoint, the decision in Jaffee v.
Redmond decreases the likelihood that a particular confidential
communication will be held inadmissible in state court, but
admissible should suit be brought in or removed to a federal court
sitting in the same state. On a symbolic level, federal courts have
not been hospitable to claims of privilege in the nearly thirty years
since Congress rejected proposed privilege rules recommended by
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
From the viewpoint of a practitioner, the Supreme Court's
strong support for a therapist-patient privilege in this era of managed
mental health care is striking and is in stark contrast to the assaults
on privacy and confidentiality that abound in the current push toward
computerization of health care information. The policy reasons
articulated by the Court for adopting the privilege rest squarely on
the heightened need for confidentiality in psychotherapeutic
relationships. While the privilege itself applies only in federal
litigation, the Court's reasoning in adopting it may prove persuasive
in other contexts in which psychotherapists seek to protect the
confidences of their patients from disclosure.' Nonetheless, there
1. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (holding that a psychotherapist-
patient privilege protected from discovery the conversations and notes taken by a
social worker during therapy sessions with a police officer sued for civil rights
violations).
2. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
3. For a history of the present federal privilege rule and the policy behind it,
see generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5421-22 (West 1989).
4. In November 1999, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services issued proposed privacy regulations for healthcare records. See Standards
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918
(1999) (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64). The
preamble to the proposed regulations cited Jaffee approvingly. 64 Fed. Reg. at
59,941-42. But the proposed regulations themselves did not expressly recognize
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. They did provide for numerous instances in
which psychotherapy notes would be subject to disclosure without patient consent.
64 Fed. Reg. at 59,942. Now that the public comment period has ended, it remains
to be seen what special protections will be given to psychotherapist-patient
communications in the final version of the regulations. See also UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 449 (1999)
[Vol. 20:1
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will inevitably be limits to the protection afforded by this new
privilege. While there is a public interest in protecting patient
confidences, that interest is not absolute.
In this Article, I discuss the major developments in the
federal law of psychotherapist-patient privilege since Jaffee and
explore some of the questions left open by the Supreme Court,
particularly regarding who is a "psychotherapist" for purposes of the
privilege and what exceptions to the privilege should be recognized
in light of competing public policy concerns. I argue that the federal
courts should apply the privilege to communications with licensed
psychotherapists as well as those reasonably believed to be
psychotherapists by the patient holding the privilege. While state
privilege law may be looked to for guidance in determining who
qualifies as a psychotherapist for purposes of the privilege, the
federal courts should seek to develop a uniform approach to this
issue in light of the policies behind the Jaffee decision. I also argue
that in recognizing exceptions to the privilege, courts should be
aware of the subjective nature of psychotherapeutic communications.
The courts should also look to the analogous attorney-client privilege
explicitly relied on by the Supreme Court in Jaffee and should
formulate any exceptions narrowly to protect the important public
and private interests served by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
II. The Jaffee decision
In Jaffee v. Redmond the United States Supreme Court
recognized a new privilege in federal courts for confidential
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient.5
Although a psychotherapist-patient privilege was among the
privileges recommended to Congress in 1972 by the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee,6 Congress ultimately created no
specific privileges and instead adopted Federal Rule of Evidence
501, which provides that privileges in federal court "shall be
governed by the principles of the common law, as they may be
5. 518 U.S. at 15.
6. See generally Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rule 504, 56
F.R.D. 183, 241-44 (1972).
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interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience."7 Since that time, every state has enacted some form
of psychotherapist-patient privilege.8 But the federal circuits that
considered the issue before Jaffee were split.9
The Supreme Court in Jaffee concluded that Rule 501 "did
not freeze the law regarding the privileges of witnesses in federal
trials at a particular point in history" but allowed for adaptation of
the law to changing circumstances.10 The Court noted the states'
unanimous legislative determination that a psychotherapist privilege
is warranted and also examined the history in the federal courts of
the psychotherapist privilege proposed in rejected Federal Rule of
Evidence 504. In addition, the Court considered whether the
private and public interests served by the proposed privilege were
sufficiently important to outweigh the general rule in favor of using
all available evidence to ascertain the truth at trial.
The Court first noted that "[like the spousal and attorney-
client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is 'rooted in
the imperative need for confidence and trust.""... The patient's
private interests in confidentiality are significant, the Court
concluded, because successful psychotherapy depends on the
patient's willingness to discuss "facts, emotions, memories, and
fears," public disclosure of which "may cause embarrassment or
disgrace."' 3  The public interest is also served by protecting
therapist-patient communications because doing so facilitates
treatment and the "mental health of our citizenry, no less than its
7. FED. R. EvID. 501.
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975); CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. §§ 1010,
1012, 1014 (West 1995); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4507 (McKinney 1992).
9. The Second and Sixth Circuits had recognized the privilege, as did the
Seventh Circuit in its decision below in Jaffee, but the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits had declined to do so. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 7.
10. Id. at 8-9. Since no psychotherapist-patient privilege was recognized at
common law, this interpretation of the language of Rule 501 allowed the Court to
create one "in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501.
11. See id. at 11 n. 11. Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504 would have
created a privilege for confidential communications between a psychiatrist or
psychologist and her patient. See generally, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 3,
§§ 5521-52.
12. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. U.S., 335 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
13. Id. The Court distinguished this aspect of psychotherapy from medical
treatment for physical problems, which can often be based on objective
information and test results. See id.
[Vol. 20:1
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physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance."14
Weighing these considerations, the Court held that "confidential
communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients
in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled
disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." 15
In fashioning the new privilege, the majority disagreed with
the Seventh Circuit's ruling that this privilege should be subject to a
balancing test in each case to determine whether the need for the
evidence in question outweighed the patient's interest in
confidentiality.16 Having concluded that "the mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship
necessary for successful treatment," the Court ruled that the privilege
would be ineffective in promoting appropriate treatment if patients
could not know in advance that their statements to therapists would
be protected from disclosure. 7  "Making the promise of
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the
relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of
the privilege."18
Like the attorney-client privilege, the privilege created in
Jaffee is unconditional rather than qualified. In so holding, the
Supreme Court went beyond the holdings of any of the circuit courts
that had previously recognized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.1 The Supreme Court did not, however, attempt to fully
delineate the scope of the privilege, leaving that to be developed on a
case-by-case basis in the lower courts.2 ° The lower federal courts
have already begun to grapple with the difficult task of upholding the
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id. at 15.
16. See id. at 17-18.
17. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
18. Id. at 17.
19. The Second and Sixth Circuits, like the Seventh Circuit below in Jaffee,
applied a balancing test to assertions of the privilege. See In re John Doe, 964
F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983). Such a test
does not afford much predictability for the patient, as the Second Circuit
acknowledged: "Indeed, the privilege amounts only to a requirement that a court
give consideration to a witness's privacy interests as an important factor to be
weighed in the balance in considering the admissibility of psychiatric histories or
diagnoses." John Doe, 964 F.2d at 1329.
20. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18.
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policy behind the privilege while limiting its scope in various ways,
including defining the characteristics of a psychotherapist and
creating certain exceptions to the privilege.
III. Who is a "Psychotherapist"?
During the 1950s and 1960s, when state privilege statutes
were first being adopted, psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic
psychotherapy were the dominant forms of non-physical treatment
for mental and emotional problems.21 In the United States both were
almost exclusively practiced by psychiatrists.22 These therapies are
based on Sigmund Freud's ideas about the importance of
unconscious processes in motivating people's actions and in
determining the conscious concerns and symptoms that bring them to
therapy. The psychoanalytically oriented therapist relies on the
patient's free associations-the attempt to say whatever comes to
mind, no matter how shameful or distressing, without censoring or
editing thoughts-to help the patient understand how his mind works
and how his conscious concerns have been shaped by unconscious
factors. In recommending the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence
504 in 1972, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
recognized that such complete disclosure of thoughts and feelings
requires the utmost confidentiality between therapist and patient:
"[A] psychiatrist's ability to help her patients 'is completely
dependent upon [the patients'] willingness and ability to talk
freely."'2 3  This view was echoed by various professional mental
health organizations acting as amici curiae in the Jaffee case twenty-
five years later:
21. See Paul W. Mosher, M.D., Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The
History and Significance of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Jaffee v.
Redmond (1999) (unpublished paper available at httpl:psa-uny.orgjr/) (discussing
the centrality of the psychoanalytic model to the development of psychotherapist-
patient privilege laws.) Dr. Mosher has also set up a website devoted to
developments in federal psychotherapist-patient privilege law, including the briefs
from Jaffee and information about subsequent cases and research in the area. The
website is available at http://www.jaffee-redmond.org.
22. See id.
23. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed
Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)).
[Vol. 20:1
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The central challenge of psychoanalytically-based
psychotherapy lies in the fact that it is not easy to
bring into conscious awareness that which is
unconscious. Generally, emotions, thoughts, or
experiences remain out of consciousness because they
are shameful, frightening or otherwise "not acceptable
to the patient." . . . Individuals develop strong
unconscious defenses or "resistances". . . to keep
knowledge of these disconcerting thoughts and
feelings from becoming conscious. To further
patients' understanding, the psychoanalytic therapist
helps them to overcome these "resistances" using
techniques whose prerequisite is a safe, confidential
treatment situation.24
Although the influence of psychoanalysis has declined
considerably since the 1950s, psychoanalytic psychotherapy is still
widely practiced. While many other schools of therapy and groups
of practitioners have also developed and expanded, psychotherapy in
its myriad current forms still involves revealing painful, often
shameful, thoughts and feelings in hopes of gaining relief from
emotional distress and destructive or debilitating patterns of
behavior. Today, in addition to psychiatrists and psychologists,
social workers, marriage and family therapists, and counselors of
varied backgrounds and training all provide psychotherapy. The
rationale for the privilege recognized in Jaffee has its roots in
Freudian psychoanalysis, but the Supreme Court in determining the
new privilege's scope also took into account the considerable
24. Brief of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Division of
Psychoanalysis (39) of the American Psychological Association, and the National
Membership Committee on Psychoanalysis in Clinical Social Work as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No.
95-266) (citations omitted) [hereinafter APA Brief]. In deciding Jaffee, the
Supreme Court was persuaded by these arguments to conclude that "[e]ffective
psychotherapy... depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which
the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories and fears." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
25. See APA Brief, supra note 24, at 5-6 (citing L. LUBORSKY ET AL,
PREFACE, PSYCHODYNAMIC TREATMENT RESEARCH: A HANDBOOK FOR CLINICAL
PRACTICE (N. Miller et al eds., 1993)).
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changes that have occurred in the practice of psychotherapy since the
time Federal Rule of Evidence 504 was proposed.26
A. Extension of the Privilege in Jaffee
In Jaffee the Supreme Court put itself squarely on the side of
democratizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's ruling that the privilege should apply
to social workers as well as psychiatrists and psychologists and
thereby expanded the coverage contemplated by the drafters
of rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504.27 Acknowledging the
changes in the mental health field in the quarter century since Rule
504 was proposed, the Court concluded:
Today, social workers provide a significant amount of
mental health treatment. . . . Their clients often
include the poor and those of modest means who
could not afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or
psychologist,.., but whose counseling sessions serve
the same public goals.28
In deciding to extend the privilege to communications with social
workers, the Court was again influenced by state legislation, noting
that most states provide such a privilege.29
The only other guidance the Supreme Court supplied in its
holding was that the psychotherapist must be "licensed" and that the
confidential communication must take place "in the course of
26. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15-16.
27. See id. at 16-17. Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(a)(2) defined a
"psychotherapist" as:
(A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or
reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including drug
addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the
laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged."
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1972) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule] (emphasis added).
28. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15-16.
29. Id. at 16-17.
[Vol. 20:1
HeinOnline -- 20 Rev. Litig. 8 2000-2001
Winter 2000] Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
diagnosis or treatment."3 Apart from the extension of coverage to
social workers, the holding tracks rejected Federal Rule of Evidence
504, which defined a psychotherapist as someone "authorized to
practice medicine" or "licensed or certified as a psychologist" under
state law, and provided a privilege for confidential communications
made while that person was "engaged in the diagnosis or treatment
of a mental or emotional condition."' The Court's rationale for
extending the privilege to social workers, however, suggests that
other licensed mental health professionals will also be found to come
within the privilege in the future.32 Indeed, under many states' laws
the therapist-patient privilege already extends to other groups such as
marriage and family therapists and professional and lay counselors in
settings such as schools and rape crisis centers.33 As I discuss below,
the lower courts have already tended to broaden the definition of
who is a psychotherapist for purposes of the privilege by looking
primarily to the counseling purpose of the consultation in question as
evidence of its privileged nature.
B. Subsequent Developments in Federal Court
1. Broadened Definitions of "Psychotherapist"
Some courts since Jaffee have already indicated that they will
extend the privilege beyond the three professional groups listed by
the Supreme Court. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. St. Michael Hospital34 the court assumed, without discussion of
what license the therapist held, that the plaintiff's "marriage
30. Id. at 15.
31. Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 240.
32. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15-16 (extending the privilege to social workers
because they often perform the same functions as psychologists).
33. The District of Columbia, for example, includes the following as "mental
health professionals" covered by its privilege: licensed physicians; psychologists;
social workers; professional marriage, family, and child counselors; rape crisis or
sexual abuse counselors; licensed professional psychiatric nurses; and anyone
reasonably believed to be any of the preceding. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2001(11)
(1981).
34. No. CIV.A.96-C-1428, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 8,
1997).
HeinOnline -- 20 Rev. Litig. 9 2000-2001
The Review of Litigation
counseling" records fell within the privilege established in Jaffee.35
In Fox v. Gates Corp.,36 an Americans with Disabilities Act claim,
the defendant sought the plaintiff's psychotherapy records, which the
plaintiff claimed were privileged under Jaffee." Although the court
did not specify what license the plaintiff's therapist held, it .noted that
"[t]he court uses the term 'psychotherapist' generically to include a
psychologist, psychiatrist, counselor or other mental health
therapist."'38 Similarly, in Greet v. Zagrocki,39 a federal civil rights
case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been held at gunpoint for an
hour by the defendant policeman for no apparent reason.4" During
discovery, the plaintiff sought various documents from the City of
Philadelphia, including those "maintained by any in-house alcohol
dependency program operated for the benefit of police personnel." '41
The City asserted that the documents were privileged without citing
what privilege the City believed would apply. The district judge,
having originally ordered production of the documents, reconsidered
his ruling in light of Jaffee and concluded that the psychotherapist
privilege applied because the "EAP [Employee Assistance Program]
engages in sensitive counseling on problems of alcohol
dependency."42 The court made no finding regarding what "licensed
psychotherapist" the police officer may have consulted through the
EAP but concluded that the privilege applied since "counseling"
was involved.43
35. Id. at *7. In addition to psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers,
marriage and family therapists, psychiatric nurses, and professional and non-
professional counselors of many backgrounds all provide psychotherapy. The
training and licensing requirements for these different groups vary from state to
state, as does the availability of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
36. 179 F.R.D. 303 (D. Colo. 1998).
37. See id. at 304-05.
38. Id. at 305 n.2.
39. No. CIV.A.96-2300, 1996 WL 724933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
40. See id. at *1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *2. See also U.S. v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Ma. 1996). In that
case, the court in dicta concluded that a client of a rape counseling center "holds
some form of a federal privilege" for communications with a rape crisis counselor,
based on the policies discussed in Jaffee. Id. at 99. However, since the counselor
in question was not a licensed psychotherapist or social worker, the court
concluded that the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee
did not apply.
[Vol. 20:1
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By contrast, in United States v. Schwensow" the defendant
argued on appeal to the Seventh Circuit that statements he made to
volunteer workers at an Alcoholics Anonymous office were
privileged under Jaffee and should not have been admitted into
evidence.45 The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision
to admit the evidence, pointing out that the workers did not
possess[] credentials that might qualify them as
licensed to receive privileged communications. Nor
did they act or hold themselves out to be acting in the
capacity of counselors, much less licensed counselors.
They did not identify themselves as therapists or
counselors, nor did they confer with Schwensow in a
fashion that resembled a psychotherapy session.46
Only one case has been found dealing with the application of
the privilege to someone "reasonably believed" by the patient to be a
psychotherapist but who was not actually a psychotherapist. In
Speaker v. County of San Bernadino47 the defendant police officer
was ordered to undergo confidential counseling after a shooting
incident that led to a federal civil rights action.48 The counselor in
question, Bonnie Mathews, was a licensed marriage, family and
child counselor (MFCC). The defendant asserted the psycho-
therapist privilege when the plaintiffs sought to discover the records
of the counseling sessions. In ruling on the plaintiffs' motion, the
court avoided the question of whether the federal privilege extended
to MFCCs by concluding that Mathews had not been acting within
the scope of her license when she provided "critical
intervention/post-traumatic stress" counseling to the police officer.49
Instead, the court analyzed whether the police officer's reasonable
belief that his conversations with Mathews were privileged was
44. 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 657.
46. Id.
47. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
48. Id. at 1107.
49. Id. at 1110-11. California law limits the practice of MFCCs to services
"for the purpose of achieving more adequate, satisfying, and productive marriage
and family adjustments." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4980.02 (Deering 2000).
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sufficient.5" Looking to the analogous law that allows attorney-client
privilege when a client reasonably but mistakenly believes his
confidant is a lawyer, the court upheld application of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege."
2. What Communications are Protected?
Communications must be confidential to qualify for the
privilege established in Jaffee.52 Without an expectation of privacy
on the part of the patient, there is no private interest to be protected.
Also, there is no public interest in protecting such communications
from disclosure in court. Thus, the defendants in Kamper v. Gray53
sought to protect records of psychological evaluations from
discovery by claiming that they were privileged under Jaffee. The
court ruled that the privilege never attached because Gray had been
required as a condition of employment to undergo the evaluations
and he knew that the results would be submitted to his employer. 4
The court stated that:
In Jaffee it appears that the defendant police officer
voluntarily sought counseling and that no reports
regarding these sessions were submitted by the
counselor to third parties. In contrast, Gray was
required to be evaluated . . . and reports of those
evaluations were submitted to Gray's employer.
Since he was aware that his evaluations would be
reported to his employer, Gray had no reasonable
50. Id. at 1112.
51. Id. at 1112-15.
52. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9. There must also be a communication. In
Pfeifer v. State Farm Ins. Co., No CIV.A.96-1895, 1997 WL 276085, at *1 (E.D.
La. Aug. 8, 1997), the court ordered production of a journal kept by plaintiff at his
psychiatrist's suggestion on the grounds that "[n]othing . . . suggests that his
journal was intended to be or actually was used as a communication between him
and his therapist."
53. 182 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
54. Id. at 599.
[Vol. 20:1
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expectation of confidentiality regarding his
communications with [the evaluators].55
Other cases have held that the privilege does attach even
when the psychological evaluations in question are employer-
mandated if no report is made to the employer about the content of
the sessions. In Williams v. District of Columbia,6 before a police
department would allow a police officer-who was the defendant in
a federal civil rights case-to return to work, he was required to
meet with a psychiatrist." The psychiatrist was to make a "'Yes or
No' recommendation regarding whether the officer should return to
active duty" but was not to disclose any psychiatric records or any
confidential communications from the officer to the department. 8
Under these circumstances, the court held that the officer had not
waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege and denied a motion to
compel discovery of the psychiatrist's records.59 Similarly, in Greet
v. Zagrocki6 the court denied discovery of the records of a police
department's in-house alcohol dependency program because "the
EAP [Employee Assistance Program] is required to maintain the
confidences of its clients, and is not even allowed to share
information with the police department."6
Under the holding in Jaffee, communications not only must
be confidential but also must be made in the course of diagnosis or
treatment.62 That point seems to have escaped the court in Williams
v. District of Columbia63 when it rejected the plaintiffs argument
55. Id.; accord Phelps v. Coy, 194 F.R.D. 606 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that
there is no expectation of confidentiality and no privilege where party knew
therapist's evaluations would be submitted to an employer); Scott v. Edinburg, 101
F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Revelle v. Darby Borough Police Officer Trigg,
No.CIV.A.95-5885, 1999 WL 80283 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1999); Barrett v. Vojtas,
182 F.R.D. 177 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
56. No. CIV.A.96-0200-LFO, 1997 WL 224921 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1997).
57. See id. at *2.
58. Id.; see also Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154 (D.N.J. 2000)
(holding that the privilege applies where party had expectation of confidentiality in
employer-ordered psychological evaluation).
59. Id. at *2.
60. No. CIV.A.96-2300, 1996 WL 724933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
61. Id. at*1.
62. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 16.
63. No. CIV.A.96-0200-LFO, 1997 WL 224921 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1997).
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that any statements made by the defendant police officer in the
course of his post-incident psychiatric "debriefing" were not made
for treatment purposes and thus were not privileged. 4 In United
States v. Schwensow,65 however, the Seventh Circuit supported its
holding that the Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers in question were
not within the Jaffee privilege by noting that Schwensow's
conversation with the volunteers appeared to be limited to seeking
the address of a detoxification center and using the telephone in their
office:
These interactions did not relate to diagnosis,
treatment, or counseling of Schwensow for purposes
of attempting to treat his alcoholism. . . . Under
no circumstances can these communications be
interpreted as "confidential communications" entitled
to protection from disclosure under Rule 501.66
C. Should the Federal Courts Follow the States' Definition
of "Psychotherapist"?
As noted above, the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee was
influenced by the fact that all states recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege and that most extend it to social workers. Does this
mean that the federal courts now should follow the states' laws in
defining who is a psychotherapist for purposes of the privilege?67 To
do so would create vertical uniformity between the federal courts and
the courts of the states in which they sit. However, it would be at the
expense of developing a federal common law of therapist-patient
privilege based on the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Jaffee. It would also replace reasoned federal judicial decisions
64. Id. at *2.
65. 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998).
66. Id. at 658.
67. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 the federal courts are required to
follow state privilege laws only in civil cases brought under state law. See, e.g.,
Whatley v. Merit Distrib. Serv., 191 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (finding that in a
civil case, the state where the court sits is determinative as to the choice of law
applied). Even in these cases, most courts that have addressed the issue have ruled
that federal privilege law governs when both a federal claim and a supplemental
state claim are joined in a single action. See, e.g., Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, 961
F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (D. Kan. 1997) (reviewing federal cases).
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about the development of the privilege with the political influences
that led to state legislative determinations about the scope of the
privilege.
The states vary widely in their definitions of who comes
within their psychotherapist-patient privileges.68 As Justice Scalia
pointed out in his dissent in Jaffee, even the supposed uniformity
among the states with regard to the social worker privilege is more
apparent than real: "[N]o State has adopted the [social worker]
privilege without restriction; the nature of the restrictions varies
enormously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and 10 States, I
reiterate, effectively reject the privilege entirely."69
Given the federal courts' general reluctance to create new
common law privileges, these courts are unlikely to take as
expansive a view as some states do when determining who is a
psychotherapist for privilege purposes.7" Nonetheless, the definition
has already widened beyond the bounds set in Jaffee, as the cases
cited earlier in this section indicate. State law will probably
continue to influence, if not determine, the federal courts' thinking in
this area because privileges are closely bound up with substantive
legislative judgments about out-of-court relationships. 71 Indeed, the
68. For example, Delaware extends the privilege only to psychotherapists
authorized to practice medicine or those reasonably believed to be so authorized,
and to licensed and certified psychologists and their assistants. See DEL. R. EVID.
§ 503(a)(3). However, the District of Columbia's statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2001(11) (Michie 1981 & Supp. 2000), is more inclusive and includes persons
licensed to practice medicine or psychology; licensed social workers; professional
marriage, family, or child counselors; rape crisis or sexual abuse counselors;
licensed professional psychiatric nurses; and any person reasonably believed by
the client to be a mental health professional.
69. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. In U.S. v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 1998), for example, the
lower court had looked to the state psychotherapist-patient privilege law for
assistance in deciding whether to extend the Jaffee definition of psychotherapist to
the Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers in question. The Wisconsin law includes
within its scope "physicians, registered nurses, chiropractors, psychologists, social
workers, marriage and family therapists, and professional counselors." Id. at 657
n.4. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did not endorse this use of state law as a guide
in defining the parameters of the federal privilege, although it noted that the
individuals in question would not qualify even under the liberal terms of the
Wisconsin law. Id. at 658.
71. See, e.g., Holland v. Muscatine Gen. Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 389 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) ("Even when not federally adopted, privileges provided by the law of
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Supreme Court's holding in Jaffee that a privileged relationship can
exist only with a licensed psychotherapist acknowledges the
importance of the states' determinations in this area.72 Complete
deference to the states in determining who is a psychotherapist for
purposes of the privilege would seriously undermine horizontal
uniformity among the federal courts, which was the goal underlying
the creation of federal evidence rules. Since the adoption of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, Congress has let the courts develop privilege
rules and has not sought to mandate vertical uniformity between state
and federal courts in non-state-law cases. As Justice Scalia pointed
out in his dissent in Jaffee, this approach to developing the federal
law of privilege would be unusual:
The Court suggests one last policy justification: since
psychotherapist privilege statutes exist in all the
States, the failure to recognize a privilege in federal
courts "would frustrate the purposes of the state
legislation that was enacted to foster these
confidential communications." . . . This is a novel
argument indeed. A sort of inverse preemption: the
truth-seeking functions of federal courts must be
adjusted so as not to conflict with the policies of the
States. . . . Moreover, since . . . state policies
regarding the psychotherapist privilege vary
considerably from State to State, no uniform federal
policy can possibly honor most of them.73
In light of these competing policy concerns, the federal courts
should not simply adopt state psychotherapist-patient privilege laws
to determine who is a psychotherapist. That would inevitably lead to
considerable disuniformity within a given circuit, much less among
the various circuits. Instead, the courts should continue to develop
the federal privilege by examining arguments for extending it to
licensed mental health professionals in addition to psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers. These issues should be examined
the forum state should be respected to the extent this can be accomplished at no
substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy.") (internal quotes and
citations omitted).
72. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
73. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
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in light of both the underlying rationale enunciated in Jaffee to
promote the "confidence and trust" on which effective
psychotherapy depends and the reasonable beliefs of the patient
about the qualifications of those in whom he confides.74 In treatment
where "frank and complete disclosure" of private information is
essential to the therapeutic process, the federal privilege should
protect the communications between a therapist and patient.75
IV. Exceptions to the Privilege
The Jaffee Court did not define the scope of the new
privilege beyond what was necessary to decide the case before it.76
In particular, the Court let the lower courts decide what situations
might warrant an exception to the privilege-indicating, however, in
footnote 19 that it expected exceptions to arise:
Although it would be premature to speculate about
most future developments in the federal psycho-
therapist privilege, we do not doubt that there are
situations in which the privilege must give way, for
example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or
to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure
by the therapist.77
Footnote 19 reveals a tension underlying the Court's creation of an
unconditional privilege for patient-therapist communications. To say
that the privilege "must give way" in certain situations is to
reintroduce a variation of the balancing component of the privilege
74. Id. at 10. Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(a)(2)(A) would have
extended the definition of psychotherapist to include someone "reasonably
believed by the patient" to be authorized to practice medicine. Proposed Rule,
supra note 27, at 240. I would recommend similarly extending the Jaffee
privilege.
75. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
76. Id. at 18. The Court was only willing to specify that participants in
confidential conversations "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty"
that the conversation will be protected. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981)). The Court recognized that it would be impossible to define the
privilege in a way that would "govern all conceivable future questions." Id.
(quoting Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 386).
77. Id. at 18 n.19.
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that had been iecognized by the Seventh Circuit in Jaffee and
rejected by the majority in the Supreme Court. 8  The quoted
footnote does not suggest that a court should undertake this
balancing in every case to determine whether to apply the privilege.
It does suggest, however, that future development of the privilege
will involve recognizing certain recurrent situations in which the
need for the evidence in question outweighs the purposes the
privilege serves. In these instances, exceptions will be made and
otherwise privileged information will be subject to disclosure.
An exception permits disclosure of an otherwise privileged
communication in certain specified circumstances. Exceptions to
privilege should be distinguished from situations in which the
privilege either does not attach (e.g., when a communication was not
intended to be confidential) or has been waived (e.g., by voluntary
disclosure of a confidential communication). The courts do not
always observe these linguistic distinctions, however. The courts
often refer instead to "implied waiver" of the privilege (e.g., by a
party who makes a claim for emotional distress damages) when
recognizing an exception to privilege. There are few exceptions to
other established privileges, like the attorney-client privilege,
because the policies served by the privilege are embodied in the
limiting definition of the privilege itself.79 The same is true for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, which applies only to "confidential
communications" that are made "for the purpose of diagnosis or
treatment" between a "licensed psychotherapist" and her patient.80 If
exceptions are common or are broadly defined the privilege will lose
the certainty of application that the Supreme Court in Jaffee saw as
essential to fulfill the policies behind the privilege.81
It is important to think about the nature of the
communications between a therapist and patient that would be
revealed under any recognized exceptions. Psychotherapy focuses
more on the psychic reality of the patient and the meaning he gives
to his experience than on objective life events. For this reason, a
78. Id. at 17.
79. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 3, at § 5501 ("It is, therefore,
important that lawyers understand that in seeking access to allegedly privileged
material, the exceptions are a last resort; most privilege claims are defeated by a
rigorous application of the terms of the privilege, not by invocation of an
exception.").
80. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
81. See id. at 10-11.
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court would lose little of significant value due to recognition of the
privilege. As argued in the American Psychoanalytic Association
brief in Jaffee:
In the attorney-client context, communications are
generally aimed at discovering facts that are relevant
to the legal issue of concern. Full disclosure in the
psychotherapeutic context, by contrast, is not a
process concerned with identifying and establishing
objective facts but rather a technique designed to
explore the patient's inner perceptions, concerns and
difficulties. Patient-therapist confidences, therefore,
are generally not reliable sources of "evidence" since
they necessarily incorporate feelings and fantasies
that, while they have great relevance to the patient's
inner life, may bear very little correspondence to
external reality. 2
Moreover, there is equally little to be gained by creating broad
exceptions to the privilege in the name of making important
information available to the trier of fact. The uncertainty that broad
exceptions would introduce into the operation of the privilege is
costly in terms of both the public and private interests that the
privilege furthers.
Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d) contained three
exceptions to the proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege: for
hospitalization proceedings, court-ordered mental exams, and suits in
which the patient relied on his mental condition as an element of a
claim or defense.83 In light of these proposed exceptions-as well
82, APA Brief, supra note 24, at 13.
83. Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d) provided for exceptions to the
privilege:
(1) ... in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness.
(2) [i]f the judge orders an examination of the mental or emotional
condition of the patient... (3) as to communications relevant to an issue
of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in
which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense,
or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies
upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 241.
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as the "serious threat of harm" exception mentioned by the Court in
Jaffee84 -the lower federal courts have begun to define the contours
of the new privilege. I will argue that in this process many courts
have weighed the importance of the new privilege too lightly and
have created overly broad exceptions to it. In so doing, they have
often failed to heed the Supreme Court's explicit analogy between
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the attorney-client
privilege, which has only a few narrow exceptions. The adoption of
broad exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege goes
against the underlying rationale of Jaffee and will jeopardize the
important private and public interests the privilege is designed to
protect.
A. The Patient-Litigant Exception
1. Civil Cases
To date, more than half the federal cases interpreting Jaffee
involve the exception addressed in rejected Federal Rules of
Evidence 504(d)(3)-the so-called "patient-litigant" exception under
which the privilege may be held not to apply if a party bases a claim
or defense on her mental or emotional condition." The most
frequent examples are plaintiffs' claims in civil cases for emotional
84. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18.
85. A standard formulation of the exception, based on rejected Federal Rules
of Evidence 504(d)(3), is found in JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 504.07(7) (2d ed. 1997): "There is no
privilege as to communications relevant to the mental or emotional condition of
the patient in any proceeding in which the patient relies on the condition as an
element of the patient's claim or defense." Whether this "relevancy" standard is
correct in light of the Jaffee decision is questionable. However, several courts
have relied on the language of rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(3) in
applying the patient-litigant exception broadly to any claim for emotional distress
damages. See, e.g., Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, CIV.98-0972-E-CGA, 1999
WL 799213, *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1999) (citing language of the rejected rule as
"significant" in adopting broad view of patient-litigant exception); Fox v. Gates
Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that Jaffee does not alter Tenth
Circuit law recognizing a broad patient-litigant exception based on the rejected
rule); Vasconcellos v. Cybex Inter., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1997) (citing
the rejected rule as the source of a broad patient-litigant exception); Kerman v.
City of New York, No. Civ. 7865, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
24, 1997) (applying the rejected rule to the facts of the case and finding "waiver"
of privilege).
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distress damages allegedly caused by the defendants' conduct.s6
Suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act in which a party's
mental condition may be part of her prima facie case on liability
under the relevant law are also common.1
7
Many courts considering the patient-litigant exception since
Jaffee have defined it broadly. These courts have concluded that the
exception applies whenever a party alleges emotional distress
damages, regardless of whether the party plans to offer expert
testimony about her mental state at trial or has made a claim for
more than incidental damages for emotional distress.88 Perhaps the
most extreme example is Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority.89  In that case, the magistrate judge
granted the defendants' motion to compel production of the
plaintiffs' psychiatric records on the grounds that the plaintiffs had
sought damages "for injury to their emotional well being," despite
the fact that the plaintiffs stipulated they
86. See, e.g., Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(applying the patient-litigant exception in a Title VII claim alleging emotional
distress); Fox v. Gates, 179 F.R.D. 303 (D. Colo. 1998) (alleging emotional
distress in an Americans with Disabilities Act claim); Vann v. Lone Star
Steakhouse & Saloon, 967 F. Supp. 346 (C.D. IM. 1997) (alleging emotional
distress in Title VII and battery claims).
87. See, e.g., Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 1999 WL 759401 (N.D. Ill
Sept. 3, 1999); Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n for Retarded Children, 1997 WL
323575 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory, 170 F.R.D. 127
(E.D. Pa. 1997). In these cases, the plaintiffs alleged that they were covered by
the Americans with Disabilities Act due to mental disability and, therefore, had to
produce evidence of that disability as part of their case in chief. In most such
cases, a plaintiff will have to rely on expert testimony to establish the "mental
impairment" that brings her within the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
88. See, e.g., Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, CIV.98-0972-E-CGA, 1999 WL
799213, *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1999) (adopting "broad" view of patient-litigant
exception); McKenna v. Cruz, CIV.A.98-1853, 1998 WL 809533, *2 (S.D. N.Y.
Nov. 19, 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that exception does not apply when
garden-variety emotional distress damages are sought); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo.
1997) (adopting a "broader" interpretation of exception). In some cases, a claim
for emotional distress damages is part of the "boilerplate" included in any suit
alleging personal injuries. In others, the plaintiff alleges "substantial" or "severe"
emotional distress resulting in large damages or brings a separate cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
89. No. CIV.A.97-593, No. CIV.A.97-1161, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14510
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997), rev'don other grounds, 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
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will not seek damages for psychiatric/psychological
injury[;] ... will not offer expert testimony in support
of their claim for emotional distress[;] ... do not seek
recovery for treatment of emotional distress; and...
have not alleged an independent tort-like action for
emotional distress. 90
Other courts, however, have taken a closer look at the
patient-litigant exception and have interpreted it more narrowly in
light of similar exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. In
Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark,91 for example, the plaintiff sued for
employment discrimination and sought damages for emotional
distress in six of the eight counts of the complaint. 92 After analyzing
Jaffee and other lower court opinions, the Massachusetts district
court held that merely making a claim for emotional distress
damages was not enough to warrant breaching the psychotherapist-
patient privilege: the plaintiff "must use the privileged
communication as evidence herself before she waives the
privilege."93 Compelling disclosure of confidential communications
simply because the plaintiff claimed emotional distress damages
would confuse relevance and the limits of privilege:
After Jaffee, a court cannot force disclosure of
[relevant] evidence solely because it may be
extremely useful to the finder of fact. Giving weight
to the usefulness of the evidence as a factor in a
decision regarding the scope of the privilege would be
a balancing exercise that was barred by Jaffee.94
In dicta, the Vanderbilt court said it would permit discovery of
privileged communications only in situations where the
communications themselves were the basis for the lawsuit-such as
90. Id. at *3. Under the circumstances, the plaintiffs might have fared better
had they simply amended their complaint to exclude any claim for emotional
distress damages.
91. 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
92. Id. at 226.
93. Id. at 228.
94. Id. at 229.
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a suit for malpractice based on the advice or findings of a therapist-
or where the patient or therapist testified to the substance of the
communications in support of an emotional distress claim."
The court in Vanderbilt analogized the situation present in
the case to a situation in which the rules of evidence recognize an
exception to the attoruey-client privilege because the attorney's
advice has been put at issue in a lawsuit.96 A later case, Hucko v.
City of Oak Forest,7 further developed the Vanderbilt court's
analogy and showed why the patient-litigant exception should not be
construed as broadly as most courts have done.98 In Hucko, the
plaintiff was found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity. He
later sued the city and individual police officers for violating his civil
rights and claimed that he suffered "humiliation [and] emotional
distress" because of the officers' misconduct during his arrest.99 He
moved for a protective order when the defendants sought his
psychiatric records. In a detailed opinion, the district court discussed
the proper scope of the patient-litigant exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, looking first to the Supreme
Court's rationale for creating the privilege in Jaffee:
In light of the Supreme Court's view that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege serves private and
public interests similar to those advanced by the
attorney-client privilege, this Court agrees that the
principles governing implied waiver of the attorney-
client privilege should apply in determining what is
sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege."0
The court then went on to look at Seventh Circuit law on
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and concluded that the advice
of counsel would be placed in issue for purposes of creating an
exception to the privilege only if a party "asserts a claim or defense,
and attempts to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or
95. Id. at 229-30.
96. See Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229.
97. 185 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. IlM. 1999).
98. See id. at 530.
99. Id. at 527.
100. Id. at 528-29.
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describing an attorney client communication."''°  The plaintiff in
Hucko had not indicated any intent to offer evidence relating to
communications with his therapists; therefore, the court concluded
he had not waived his privilege in the records sought by the
defendants."°2 The court held that the mere fact that the plaintiff
claimed emotional harm made his psychiatric records relevant to the
case but was not enough to override the privilege:
The Court recognizes that, at first blush, it may
appear anomalous that a plaintiff who seeks damages
for emotional pain and suffering may be privileged
from producing medical records that may shed light
on that claim. However, that is no more anomalous
than allowing a defendant in a patent case to deny
willful infringement and at the same [sic] maintain
the privilege in an opinion letter of counsel that might
shed light on that claim. In both instances, that is the
price we pay for recognizing a privilege, a price that
the law deems necessary in order to obtain the
supervening private and public benefits that inure
from recognition of the privilege. °3
In Allen v. Cook County Sheriff's Department,"4 a sexual
harassment case decided two days after Hucko, the court drew a
similar distinction. The court denied a motion to compel depositions
of the plaintiffs therapists, holding that the plaintiffs allegations of
101. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
102. See Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 529.
103. Id. at 531. Such an interpretation of the patient-litigant exception differs
from that proposed by the drafters of rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(3),
who would have applied the exception whenever the privileged communications
were "relevant" to an element of a party's claim or defense. Proposed Rule, supra
note 27, at 241. However, the court in Hucko did not consider itself bound by the
Rule 504 standard. The court concluded that Congress's failure to adopt the
proposed rule indicated its view that the "law of privilege was still evolving."
Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 530. The Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee to extend the
privilege to social workers offers further support for this view. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at
15. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 75
(1st Cir. 1999) ("When reason and experience lead us in a different direction than
a rejected provision in the proposed rules, we are bound by law to follow the
former.").
104. No. 97-C3625, 1999 WL 168466 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1999).
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emotional distress were not enough to put her mental state at issue. '
The district judge noted, however, that the situation would be
different if the plaintiff were to indicate an intention to call her
therapist as an expert witness on the issue of emotional distress:
Fundamental fairness demands that the defendants
should have ample opportunity to scrutinize the basis
for the opinions of Allens' therapists if she attempts
to elicit therapist testimony or evidence to prove her
damages caused by her alleged emotional distress. In
that instance, Allen would necessarily implicate the
substance of her confidential patient-therapist
communications and thereby waive her privilege."16
A party who intends to prove emotional distress solely
through her own testimony can be deposed on that subject, and this
discovery will be sufficient to prevent unfair surprise at trial without
violating the confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship." 7 The
courts' reasoning in Vanderbilt, Hucko and Allen is supported by the
Supreme Court's policy judgments in Jaffee and by the Court's
emphasis on predictable application of the new privilege."0 It is one
thing for a party knowingly to waive the privilege in order to gain
the benefit of a therapist's expert testimony on emotional distress
damages; it is quite another for a defendant to be able to force
discovery of confidential patient-therapist communications whenever
an opposing party alleges emotional distress." 9 For example, in
McKenna v. Cruz' the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
the patient-litigant exception should not apply to "garden-variety" or
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id. at *2. See also, Booker v. City of Boston, No. 97-CV 12534-MEL,
No. 97-CV-12675-MEL, 1999 WL 734644 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999) (finding that
because of the "exceptionally strong language" of Jaffee, privilege is not waived
unless the plaintiff "makes positive use of the privileged material in the
prosecution of her case").
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
108. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18.
109. See, e.g. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851,
863 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding no waiver of privilege in the attorney-client context
unless the "client has made the decision and taken the affirmative step in the
litigation to place the advice of the attorney in issue").
110. No. 98 CIV. 1853, 1998 WL 809533 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998).
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"boilerplate" claims for emotional distress damages."' The court
worried that attempting to distinguish between garden-variety and
non-garden-variety emotional distress claims during a lawsuit would
"re-introduce the very uncertainty the Supreme Court eliminated
when it endorsed the psychotherapist-patient privilege as an
unconditional privilege.""' 2 In so ruling, the McKenna court used the
Supreme Court's emphasis on certainty of application of the
privilege to justify an exception to that privilege.'
By contrast, several more recent cases have reasoned that a
claim for incidental emotional distress damages does not
automatically trigger the exception. 4 For example, in Jackson v.
Chubb Corp.,' 5 an employment discrimination case, the court
adopted the broad view of the patient-litigant exception, but stated in
dicta that a party making only a general claim for emotional distress
damages would not meet the threshold requirements for the
exception:
Simply put, where a plaintiff merely alleges garden-
variety emotional distress and neither alleges a
separate tort for the distress, any specific psychiatric
injury or disorder, or unusually severe distress, that
plaintiff has not placed his/her mental condition at
issue to justify a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege." 6
111. Id. at *2-3. (adopting the broad view that the patient-litigant exception
applies to "any" claim for emotional distress).
112. Id. at*2.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Ruhlmann v. Ulster Co. Dept. of Social Serv., 194 F.R.D. 445
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the patient-litigant exception does not apply to a
claim for incidental emotional distress damages); Krocka v. City of Chicago, 193
F.R.D. 542 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff retained the psychotherapist-
patient privilege by limiting his claim for emotional distress damages to
embarrassment and humiliation); Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J.
2000) (holding that a garden-variety emotional distress claim does not trigger the
patient-litigant exception); Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (holding that the plaintiff preserved the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
self-imposed limitations on the scope of her emotional distress claim).
115. 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J. 2000).
116. Id. at225 n.8.
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The Vanderbilt-Hucko-Allen approach to the scope of the
patient-litigant exception is also supported by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which explicitly limit discovery to "any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." '117 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 also provides
for a court-ordered independent mental examination when good
cause is shown.118 This examination avoids any intrusion into the
therapeutic relationship and provides the opposing party with expert
information regarding the mental state of the patient. Traditionally,
these examinations have not been routinely ordered because of the
invasion of privacy involved.119 In light of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege recognized in Jaffee, however, ordering these
examinations is more justifiable than creating a broad patient-litigant
exception to the new privilege. Nonetheless, at least one court since
Jaffee has interpreted the patient-litigant exception broadly, while at
the same time ruling that the party's mental condition was not
sufficiently "in controversy" to warrant a Rule 35 exam. 20 Given
that the first avenue of discovery intrudes on a privileged
relationship and the second does not, this ruling takes too broad a
view of the patient-litigant exception to the privilege, while carefully
protecting the party's privacy interest in avoiding an independent
mental exam.1"'
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
119. See, e.g., Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1995)
(explaining that Rule 35(a) is not meant to be applied broadly and that certain
conditions must exist before defendant will be allowed this examination will be
ordered). When an exam is ordered, the party ordered to be examined is entitled to
receive a copy of "a detailed written report of the examiner setting out the
examiner's findings, including results of all tests made, diagnoses and
conclusions." FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(1). By requesting a copy of the examiner's
report, the party obligates itself to provide, upon request, reports of any
examinations it has made of the same condition. See id.
120. See Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 306 (D. Colo. 1998).
121. The court in Fox noted that a majority of courts will not order a Rule 35
exam unless, in addition to a claim for emotional distress
one or more of the following factors is also present: (1) a specific cause
of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2)
plaintiff has alleged a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder; (3)
plaintiff has claimed unusually severe emotional distress; (4) plaintiff has
offered expert testimony in support of her claim for emotional distress
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The court in Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc."m took
a more sensible approach. It ruled that the plaintiffs claims for
substantial emotional distress damages and for intentional infliction
of emotional distress had placed her mental state in issue." At the
same time, the court limited the defendant's right of discovery "in
light of the important public policy behind the... psychotherapist
privilege."'24  Not only would the defendant be "limited to
information that is directly relevant to the lawsuit," but he also
would have to establish that "such an intrusion into the therapeutic
relationship is the only possible means to obtain relevant
information."' 25  Since the plaintiff had offered to undergo an
independent psychiatric evaluation, the defendant would likely have
difficulty convincing the court it was necessary to destroy the
confidentiality of the plaintiffs therapeutic relationship in order to
defend against her claims. 6
Most courts considering the patient-litigant exception to the
Jaffee privilege have failed to analyze the analogy to the attorney-
client privilege carefully and to consider how the exception should
appropriately be limited. Some courts have instead adopted the view
that fairness to the opposing party, who would otherwise be denied
access to evidence likely to bear on a plaintiffs claimed injury,
requires an exception. In Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. St. Michael Hospital,'27 for example, the plaintiff
alleged that racial discrimination by the defendant resulted in
emotional pain and suffering and caused marital difficulties that led
damages; and (5) plaintiff concedes that her mental condition is "in
controversy" within the meaning of [the Rule].
Fox, 179 F.R.D. at 307. This is a much more stringent standard than most post-
Jaffee courts have used in recognizing a patient-litigant exception to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. But see Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225
n.8 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that a garden-variety emotional distress claim does not
"waive" the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
122. 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1997).
123. See id. at 709.
124. Id. at 708-09.
125. Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
126. See id. The Vasconcellos court also noted that plaintiff had the option of
withdrawing her claims for emotional distress and for intentional infliction of
emotional distress as a means of avoiding inquiry into her communications with
her therapist. 962 F. Supp. at 709.
127. No. 96-C-1428, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 8,
1997).
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to counseling.12 The court denied the EEOC's motion for a
protective order prohibiting discovery of the counseling records,
saying that "it is axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot brandish a sword
and deny the defense a shield. Thus, the privilege must be waived or
the EEOC shall be precluded from seeking damages related to any
alleged harm done to Ms. Johnson's marriage."'29  The court's
reasoning ignores the fact that the plaintiff had not indicated any
intent to use the counselor's testimony to support her emotional
distress claim. It also assumes that the relevancy of the records
trumps the privilege-despite the Supreme Court's explicit judgment
in Jaffee that protection of the therapeutic relationship outweighs the
value of truth-seeking in these circumstances. 3 °
Many cases since Jaffee have recognized a broad patient-
litigant exception consonant with the mere "relevancy" standard of
rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(3). However, their
numbers are deceiving. Many of the courts reached the same
results they would have reached under the narrow interpretation
adopted in Vanderbilt, Hucko, and Allen. Usually this occurs either
because the party-patient does in fact intend to call the therapist to
testify about emotional distress,13 1 will need expert testimony to
establish that he is a member of a protected class because he has a
mental impairment, 32 or has conceded the waiver. 3 3 In Jackson v.
Chubb Corp.,3 for example, the court adopted the broad view of the
128. Id. at *7.
129. Id.
130. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12.
131. See, e.g., Puricelli v. Houston, No. CIV.A.99-2982, 2000 U.S. Dist. WL
760522, at *18 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2000); Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88-CV-1175,
1997 WL 151799, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997); Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse
& Saloon, 967 F. Supp. 346, 349 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
132. See, e.g., Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory, 170 F.R.D. 127, 131 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (alleging emotional distress in an Americans with Disabilities Act claim);
see also Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 97-C06417, 1999 WL 259401, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999); Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n for Retarded Children, No.
96-C4713, 1997 WL 323575, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997). Sarko is the leading
case cited by courts for a "broad" view of the patient-litigant exception where
emotional distress damages are sought. Since it is an ADA case, however, the
plaintiff in that case could not establish liability without proving that she had or
was perceived as having a mental disability.
133. See Kerman v. City of New York, No. 96-CIV-7865, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16841, at *8 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997).
134. 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J. 2000).
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exception after a careful analysis of the conflicting case law.135 At
the same time, the court qualified its decision by noting that the
result in the case would be the same under the narrow view, since the
plaintiff "clearly intends" to present expert testimony on her mental
condition. 36 Further the court opined in dicta that claims for
incidental emotional distress are not even sufficient to trigger the
exception.'37
2. Criminal Cases
The patient-litigant exception also applies in criminal cases
when, for example, a defendant raises an insanity defense. However,
there are few post-Jaffee cases in which the issue has arisen. In
United States v. Sturman'38 the defendant notified the government as
required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(b) that he
might offer expert psychiatric testimony "to demonstrate that he
lacked the requisite specific intent to commit the alleged crimes." '139
The government then subpoenaed the records of four doctors who
had treated the defendant in the past. The government argued that
the defendant put his mental state in issue by indicating that he might
present psychiatric testimony at trial. In granting the defendant's
motion to quash the subpoenas, the court noted that specific intent is
an element of the government's case in chief, rather than an
affirmative defense for which the defendant has the burden of
proof.4 ' Therefore, if the prosecution's evidence on specific intent
was not persuasive, the defendant would be unlikely to present any
psychiatric testimony of his own at trial. Taking a narrow view of
the patient-litigant exception under these circumstances, the court
ruled that the "[defendant's] mental condition, while unquestionably
conspicuous in pretrial litigation, has not been placed in issue for
purposes of trial. Unless and until [he] proceeds with such a defense
at trial, he cannot be said to have waived his rights under the
psychotherapist-patient privilege."' 4'
135. See id. at 226-27.
136. Id. at 227.
137. See id. at 226-27.
138. No.96-CR-318, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3488 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998).
139. Id. at *1-2.
140. See id.
141. Id. at *12. The Sturman court's reasoning that the privilege is not lost
until testimony has been given by defense witnesses about the defendant's mental
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United States v. Hansen42 deals with an aspect of the patient-
litigant exception addressed in the second part of rejected Federal
Rule of Evidence 504(d)(3): What happens when the patient is
deceased and another party relies on the patient's mental condition as
an element of that party's claim or defense.143 The defendant in
Hansen sought the psychotherapy treatment records of the deceased
murder victim.1" The court concluded that the privilege survived
death and the deceased's therapist could properly assert it on behalf
of his former client.145 The court nonetheless held that the facts of
the case mandated disclosure:
In Jaffee, the Court found that the important public
and private interests underlying the privilege
outweighed the "modest" evidentiary benefit that
would likely result from denial of the privilege....
Here, in contrast, the likely evidentiary benefit is
great: the defendant is charged with homicide and
faces a possible loss of liberty. The mental and
emotional condition of the deceased is a central
element of her claim of self-defense.1
46
The court decided that the patient's private interest in maintaining
confidentiality was minimal because he was dead and that the public
interest in assuring the confidentiality of therapist-patient
communications, while significant, had to give way under the facts
of the case.147
state is similar to the reasoning in civil cases like Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark,
174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997), Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526
(N.D. Ill. 1999), and Allen v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 1999 WL 168466
(N.D. Ill. 1999).
142. 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997).
143. Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(3) reads: "There is no
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or
emotional condition of the patient. . ., after the patient's death, in any proceeding
in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or
defense." Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 241.
144. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. at 1225.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 1226.
147. See id. at 1225. Although the court in Hansen did not rely on the
proposed exceptions in rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504 in its decision, it did
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The exception recognized in Hansen has been cast into doubt,
however, by the Supreme Court's most recent privilege decision, a
case involving posthumous application of the attorney-client
privilege in the context of a criminal investigation. In Swidler &
Berlin v. United States14 the Court was asked to decide whether the
Office of Independent Counsel could have access to notes of a
meeting between Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster and a
lawyer with whom Foster consulted shortly before committing
suicide.1 49  The majority cited Jaffee in rejecting the prosecutor's
attempt to carve out an exception to the privilege for criminal
investigations:
The Independent Counsel additionally suggests that
his proposed exception would have minimal impact if
confined to criminal cases.... However, there is no
case authority for the proposition that the privilege
applies differently in criminal and civil cases ...
Balancing ex post the importance of the information
against client interests, even limited to criminal cases,
introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's
application. For just that reason, we have rejected use
of a balancing test in defining the contours of the
privilege. 50
The Supreme Court in Swidler was not prepared to say there
were no circumstances in which the privilege might be breached in
connection with a criminal case.15 1 Nonetheless, the majority relied
on Jaffee and emphasized the importance of certainty in applying the
privilege. 52 In the context of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
the Swidler decision confirms that routine application of a balancing
refer to similar exceptions in state privilege rules. See id. Its holding is supported
by the language of rejected Rule 504(d)(3). See Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at
241.
148. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
149. See id. at 402-03.
150. Id. at 408-09.
151. See id. at 408-09 n.3 ("Petitioner . . . concedes that exceptional
circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might
warrant breaching the privilege. We do not, however, need to reach this issue
since such exceptional circumstances clearly are not presented here.").
152. See id. at 409.
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test in criminal cases cannot be justified, even in situations involving
a deceased patient.15a
B. Serious Threats of Harm: the "Dangerous Patient"
Exception
The Supreme Court in Jaffee made only one explicit mention
of a potential exception to the new privilege. In footnote 19, the
Court suggested allowing disclosure of patient-psychotherapist
communications if it is the only means to avert a "serious threat of
harm to the patient or to others." '54 Precisely what the Court had in
mind in this footnote is unclear. On one hand, it could refer to the
language in rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(1) creating a
narrow exception to the privilege for hospitalization proceedings
when a therapist has to testify about the patient's dangerousness to
meet civil commitment standards.155 On the other hand, the language
of the footnote could suggest a potentially far broader scope for
disclosure along the lines of the so-called Tarasoff exception to
confidentiality, under which a therapist may be held civilly liable for
failure to use reasonable care to protect third parties threatened by a
patient."' The lack of any clear reference or context for the Court's
153. See Swindler, 524 U.S. at 407-08. The holding in Swidler suggests that
the Supreme Court would likely find that the psychotherapist-patient privilege
survives the death of the patient, thus departing from rejected Rule 504 in this
respect as it did with application of the privilege to social workers.
154. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
155. Rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(1) provided: "There is no
privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist, in the course of
diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of
hospitalization." Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 241.
156. Obligations imposed by the duty to third parties have been variously
formulated. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425,
439 (1976), the California Supreme Court held that "once a therapist does in fact
determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have
determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger."
A later California statute narrowed the situations in which the duty applies to cases
of "a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 1999). The statutory duty is discharged by
"making reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim... and to a
law enforcement agency." CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.92(b) (West 1999). Contrary to
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footnote in the Jaffee opinion has led the Tenth Circuit to create an
overly broad exception to the privilege in one of the few post-Jaffee
appellate opinions to date."7
In United States v. Glass 158 the defendant was indicted for
threatening to kill the President of the United States.'59 The
defendant moved to exclude from evidence his statement to the
examining psychiatrist in the mental health unit of an Oklahoma
hospital that he "wanted to shoot Bill Clinton."'' The government,
relying on footnote 19 in Jaffee, argued that the privilege was not
available under the circumstances of the case. The district court
agreed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the government's
argument that "Jaffee's rationale for the privilege.., simply does
not apply in a criminal setting.... The court held that "upon the
record before us the psychotherapist-patient privilege announced in
Jaffee is available to protect Mr. Glass's statements from compelled
disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."'62
However, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing "to
determine whether.., the threat was serious when it was uttered and
whether its disclosure was the only means of averting harm to the
President when the disclosure was made." '63  By so ruling, the
the implications of Jaffee's footnote 19, California courts after Tarasoff have held
that there is no duty to warn others when the threat of harm is to the patient
himself. See generally Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that therapist was under no obligation to disclose daughter's
suicide threats to her parents). Accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-517.02 (1999)
(obliging mental health provider to report threats against "identifiable victims");
COLO. R.EV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1999) (imposing a duty to warn only with
"serious threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person or
persons"); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16 § 5402 (1998) (stating that liability can arise
only if a patient makes threats to kill or seriously injure a "clearly identified
victim").
157. See generally George Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: the Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74
WASH. L. REV. 33 (1999) (suggesting that exception to the evidentiary privilege
should be made only if "necessary to prevent future harm to patients or identified
potential victims").
158. 133 F.3d 1356 (10thCir. 1998).
159. Id. at 1357.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1360.
163. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
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Circuit Court accepted the assertion that the language of Jaffee
footnote 19 created an exception to the psychotherapist privilege that
would permit admission of the psychiatrist's testimony in the
criminal proceeding against his patient."64 The court left the district
judge to decide only whether the conditions for the exception had in
fact been met in this case.
165
On remand, the district court heard testimony from the
psychiatrist and from a Secret Service agent.1 66 The psychiatrist
testified that Glass had been discharged to his father's care after his
hallucinations of killing the President had stopped and he was
stabilized on Haldol. Three days later, the psychiatrist learned that
Glass had left his father's home and that his whereabouts were
unknown. Concerned that Glass would again discontinue his
medication without supervision, the psychiatrist concluded that Glass
now posed a "serious threat" to the President and that involuntary
commitment was not an option because Glass had disappeared.
167
The Secret Service agent testified that he considered the threat
serious because Glass had money available to travel and had once
before been investigated for making similar threats. Based on this
evidence, the court denied Glass's motion to exclude his statements
to the psychiatrist and held that they were "properly admissible as an
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.',
68
Neither the district court nor the appellate court in Glass
considered whether the justification for the therapist's revelation of
Glass's threat to federal authorities shortly after it was made-to
prevent a future harm-also justified admission of the therapist's
testimony against his patient in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Ethical rules permit psychotherapists to disclose serious threats of
harm, 69 and many states impose tort liability by case law or by
164. See id.
165. See id. The Court of Appeals directed the district court to proceed under
Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a), which deals with preliminary determinations by
the court concerning, among other things, the existence of a privilege. See id.
166. Order, April 9, 1998, Case No. CR-96-94-T, United States District
Court, Western District of Oklahoma (Thompson, J.), at 2.
167. Id. at5.
168. Id. at 8
169. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY,
§ 4.8 (1998): ("Psychiatrists at times may find it necessary, in order to protect the
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statute on therapists who fail to warn of a patient's serious threat of
harm to a third party.170 However, as Professor Harris has argued,
Jaffee's footnote 19 conflates the Tarasoff exception to
confidentiality for serious threats of harm to third parties and the
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
evidentiary privilege:
The benefits and burdens of the Tarasoff exception to
confidentiality and the dangerous patient exception to
the evidentiary privilege are dramatically different.
There is simply no compelling reason to equate or
inseparably link them. Unfortunately, without
analyzing or even acknowledging the significant
distinctions between the two exceptions, the Jaffee
footnote appears to have done just that.... When the
dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary
privilege is analyzed separately, it finds support in the
Tarasoffprotective rationale only where disclosure of
the confidential client communications during the
evidentiary proceeding proves necessary to avert a
serious, future threat of harm to an identifiable
potential victim or the patient."'
Having applied the Jaffee privilege to criminal cases like
Glass, the Tenth Circuit would have been more consistent if it had
ruled that the therapist's testimony was not admissible against his
patient even though his original disclosure might have been proper.
At the time of trial, there is no more reason to require a therapist to
testify about a patient's past threat than about a robbery confided to
him, and the harm to the privileged relationship from compelling
testimony about either is the same. The dangerous-patient
evidentiary exception should be limited, as Professor Harris has
suggested, to situations in which disclosure is necessary to prevent
harm to others, such as hospitalization proceedings or proceedings to
patient or the community from imminent danger, to reveal confidential information
disclosed by the patient.").
170. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-517.02 (West 1995); CoLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-117 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 36B (West 1995).
171. Harris, supra note 157, at 57-58.
[Vol. 20:1
HeinOnline -- 20 Rev. Litig. 36 2000-2001
Winter 2000] Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
obtain a restraining order.172 Even in these limited instances,
testimony by a treating therapist should only be permissible as a last
resort, since an independent psychiatric examination or other
evidence will often suffice to meet statutory requirements without
infringing on the confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship.
While this Article was being edited for publication, the Sixth
Circuit handed down an opinion holding squarely that there is no
"dangerous patient" exception to the Jaffee privilege. In United
States v. Hayes73 the defendant postal worker was charged with
making repeated threats to kill the postmaster to various treating
psychotherapists connected with the Veterans Administration. 74
After one detailed threat, a therapist he was seeing on an outpatient
basis warned the postmaster and the defendant's prosecution for
threatening a federal official ensued. The defendant moved to
suppress his psychotherapy records and to exclude his therapists'
expected testimony. The district court granted the motion and
dismissed the indictment. The court of appeals affirmed. 75
First, the court of appeals stated that recognizing a dangerous
patient exception would "have a deleterious effect on the
'atmosphere of confidence and trust' in the psychotherapist-patient
relationship," since a warning that the patient's statements might be
used against him in a criminal prosecution "would certainly chill and
very likely terminate open dialogue." '176 Second, the court concluded
that footnote 19 in Jaffee was intended to refer only "to the fact that
psychotherapists will sometimes need to testify in court proceedings,
such as those for the involuntary commitment of a patient, to comply
with their 'duty to protect' the patient or identifiable third parties." '
Third, the court reasoned that adoption of such an exception would
be ill-advised, since no state other than California recognizes it in a
172. See Harris, supra note 157, at 62-64. In most states, both the existence
of mental illness and present dangerousness to self or others must be established to
warrant involuntary hospitalization. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150
(West 2000) (basing involuntary civil commitment on dangerousness to self or
others as a result of mental disorder).
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criminal case and no such exception was included in rejected Federal
Rule of Evidence 504:
We hold, therefore, that the federal psycho-
therapist/patient privilege does not impede a
psychotherapist's compliance with his professional
and ethical duty to protect innocent third parties, a
duty which may require, among other things,
disclosure to third parties or testimony at an
involuntary hospitalization proceeding. Conversely,
compliance with the professional duty to protect does
not imply a duty to testify against a patient in criminal
proceedings or in civil proceedings other than directly
related to the patient's involuntary hospitalization,
and such testimony is privileged and inadmissible if a
patient properly asserts the psychotherapist/patient
privilege.178
Although the Hayes court did not cite Professor Harris's article, its
reasoning is similar to his. There is an important distinction, both
ethically and in terms of the unconditional privilege recognized in
Jaffee, between situations where it is still possible to avert harm by
breaching confidentiality and situations where the psychotherapist's
testimony can serve only to further prosecution of the patient. The
Glass case blurred that distinction and should not be followed.
C. Other Exceptions
Since Jaffee was decided, only a few courts have considered
creating exceptions other than the patient-litigant exception and the
dangerous patient exception. In these cases, the courts have been
scrupulous about protecting the confidentiality of the therapist-
patient relationship and have looked to the law on attorney-client
privilege to define the parameters of any acceptable exception to the
Jaffee privilege.
1. Sixth Amendment Rights
178. Hayes, 2000 WL 1289028.
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Federal district courts in two states have addressed whether
defendants' rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution trump the psychotherapist privilege; both have ruled
that they do not. 179 In United States v. Haworth8 ' the defendants
sought to discover the records of psychotherapists who had
examined a witness for the prosecution."' The court held that the
records were privileged under Jaffee and that the defendants'
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against them would
permit cross-examination of the witness at trial, but not examination
of the treating therapist's records."8 2
In United States v. Doyle'1 3 the government sought an upward
departure from federal sentencing guidelines due to the extreme
psychological trauma suffered by the victim."' The defendant
subpoenaed the records of the psychologist and the social worker
who treated the victim after the crime. 8 The court rejected the
defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process outweighed the psychotherapist privilege and stated, "The
Jaffee court makes it clear that the balancing test advocated by the
defendant is not appropriate."' 86 The court emphasized the important
role that privileges play in protecting confidential communications:
"[P]rivileges . . . encourage[] . . . those in need of psychological
assistance . . . [to] reveal their most private thoughts to their
psychotherapist knowing that their volunteered statements will not
be shared with anyone else without their consent."' 8 7 The Doyle
court, like a number of courts that have considered a patient-litigant
exception to the privilege, drew an analogy to the attorney-client
privilege in refusing an in camera inspection of the therapists'
records:
179. See U.S. v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Or. 1998); U.S. v. Haworth,
168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996). But see U.S. v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1125 (D.
Mont. 1997) (holding that the defendant's need for privileged material outweighs
the public interest in preventing disclosure).
180. 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 662.
183. 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Or. 1998).
184. Id. at 1189.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1190.
187. Id. at 1191.
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In a different setting, would it be proper for a court to
conduct an in camera invasion of an attorney-client
privilege to determine if the privileged
communication was helpful to an accused? ... Can
anyone imagine the court granting a motion by the
defendants to examine [a] cooperating defendant's
attorney in camera regarding the privileged
statements made to him to determine if any could be
helpful to the defense?'88
The sound analysis in Haworth and Doyle illustrate both the
importance of drawing comparisons with the attorney-client
privilege in considering exceptions to the Jaffee privilege and the
fact that the privilege does not apply differently in criminal and civil
cases.
2. Crime-Fraud Exception
One appellate court has also considered whether there should
be a crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
similar to that recognized in the attorney-client context.'89 In In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 90 the First Circuit
ruled to enforce grand jury subpoenas for two psychiatrists whose
testimony was sought in the context of an investigation into allegedly
fraudulent disability claims by Violette. 9' In analyzing the
applicability of this exception, the court noted that the Jaffee Court
had "justified the psychotherapist-patient privilege in terms parallel
to those used for the attorney-client privilege."'92 Both privileges
"exist to foster the confidence and trust required for effective
counseling relationships" and both "serve[] the public weal."'93 In
188. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2dat 1191.
189. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 72
(1st Cir. 1999). In the attorney-client context, the crime-fraud exception requires a
prima facie showing "(1) that the client was engaged in (or was planning) criminal
or fraudulent activity when the attorney-client communications took place; and (2)
that the communications were intended by the client to facilitate or conceal the
criminal or fraudulent activity." Id. at 75.
190. 183 F.3d71 (1st Cir. 1999).
191. See id. at 75-76.
192. Id. at 76.
193. Id.
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light of these parallels, the court concluded that a crime-fraud
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege should also be
recognized "because the mental health benefits, if any, of protecting
such communications pale in comparison to 'the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
trutL 
'194
The court was careful, however, to limit the scope of this new
exception:
[I]t is important to emphasize that the crime-fraud
exception will apply only when the patient's purpose
is to promote a particular crime or fraud. Thus, for
example a career criminal's confessions to his
psychotherapist will not fall within the exception even
though the therapy may generally increase the
patient's professional productivity. 95
In this case, the court concluded that the exception should be applied
because the affidavit submitted by the government amply supported
its claim that Violette's communications to the therapists in question
were part of an effort to defraud lenders and disability insurers. 96
While the exception recognized by the First Circuit is a narrow one
that makes sense on its own terms, it is unclear why the court chose
to create an exception at all. As the appeals court acknowledged-
and as the district court explicitly found-the communications at
issue were not really made in the course of diagnosis or treatment
because the patient's purpose in seeking consultation with the
psychiatrists was to perpetrate a fraud. 97 Since that finding alone
194. Id. at 77 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 50).
195. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d at 77 (using the recent movie
Analyze This, in which a Mafia boss seeks therapy, as a fictional example of a
therapy that would not come within the crime-fraud exception to the privilege).
196. See id.
197. See id. Indeed, in discussing why the absence of a crime-fraud except-
ion in rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d) did not preclude the court's
creating one in this case, Judge Selya pointed out that "the drafters [of the rejected
rule] may have thought it self-evident that communications made for the purpose
of furthering a crime or fraud would not be deemed to be 'made for the purposes of
diagnosis or treatment' Id.
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defeats any claim of privilege, the court need not have gone further
to resolve the case.
V. Conclusion
In Jaffee v. Redmond' the Supreme Court not only
recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege but also extended it to
licensed social workers, who today provide "a significant amount of
mental health treatment."199  Following Jaffee, the lower federal
courts that have considered the question of what professionals fall
within the privilege have tended to extend the privilege even further
to include other kinds of licensed therapists and counselors. Given
the reality that psychotherapy is no longer the exclusive province of
psychiatrists and psychologists as it once was, this trend is likely to
continue. In deciding which psychotherapists the privilege covers,
federal courts will look to state law for guidance but must ultimately
rely on the public and private interests served by the privilege in
determining its outer limits.
The treatment of exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is still in the early stages of development, and few appellate
courts have addressed the issue at all. The Supreme Court in Jaffee
emphasized both the strong public policy reasons for creating an
unconditional privilege, like the attorney-client privilege, and the
importance of predictable application to an effective privilege. At
the same time, it predicted in a footnote that there would be some
exceptions to the privilege which would limit its scope. As the lower
courts have attempted to apply these somewhat contradictory
directives, some courts have adopted overly broad definitions of
potential exceptions, especially for patient-litigants and dangerous
patients, and in the process have often lost sight of the policy
concerns supporting the new privilege. Other courts and
commentators have taken more careful approaches to these
exceptions and have recognized that the well-developed law of
attorney-client privilege can provide useful guidance in the attempt
both to uphold the principles behind the psychotherapist privilege
and to define certain exceptional circumstances in which the
privilege must give way.
198. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
199. Id. at 16.
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In order to be truly effective, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege must be subject only to narrow exceptions. If we value the
mental health of our citizenry as a public good, patients' belief in the
confidential nature of their private communications of distress, fear,
and shame must be well-founded. This confidentiality must be
protected by a privilege that is subject to exceptions only in rare
cases, such as when the holder of the privilege is the subject of
hospitalization proceedings or when he sues the therapist or intends
to use the therapist as an expert witness at trial.
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